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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
Fresh Product Supply Chain Decisions Involving Transporta-
tion Discount 
Submitted by GUO, Chenkai 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in June 2008 
This paper considers a supply chain in which the producer sells 
a large batch of fresh products to the distributor. The products 
face a long distance transportation before they arrive at the dis-
tributor side. The distributor faces the risk that the product 
he has procured may decay and deteriorate during transporta-
tion. The market demand for his product depends on its level 
of freshness and his selling price. The distributor has to deter-
mine his order quantity and selling price, taking into account the 
wholesale price of the producer, the possible loss of the prod-
uct in the long distance transportation, the product's level of 
freshness when it reaches the market, and the uncertain market 
demand for his product. On the other hand, the producer has 
to determine his wholesale price based on the effect of the order 
quantity from the distributor. Apparently, the expected central-
ized supply chain profit is larger than that of the decentralized 
system. We introduce a series of the Transportation Discount 
Incentive (TDI) schemes which facilitate the coordination of the 
two parties. The scheme will focus on the transportation com-
pensation offered by the producer to the distributor. 
Meanwhile, this paper also considers a supply chain in which 
i 
the producer sells a large batch of fresh products to the distrib-
utor. And a third-party logistics (3PL) provider will help the 
distributor deliver the product. The 3PL provider will propose a 
guaranteed arrival time to the distributor based on the wholesale 
price. If the 3PL provider can not deliver the product on time, 
he has to share a portion of the transportation risk with the 
distributor. We develop a model to formulate this problem and 
derive each party's optimal decisions in both uncoordinated and 
coordinated situations. We also propose a coordination mecha-
nism which comprises two parts: (i) the producer offers a whole-
sale pricing policy as a function of the actual arrival time and 
the distributor's order quantity; and (ii) the 3PL provider offers 
a penalty factor policy as a function of the distributor's order 
quantity and the actual arrival time. We show that this coor-
dination mechanism can induce the distributor to order up to 
the quantity required to maximize the total benefit of the cen-
tralized system, and both parties will be better off through this 
mechanism. Computational studies is also conducted, which 
reveal some important managerial insights in the supply chain 
management area. 
Keywords: Supply Chain Coordination, Third-party Logistics, 
Long Distance Transportation, Perishable Products, Wholesale 
Pricing Policy, Penalty Factor Policy. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Literature 
Review 
The production of fresh products, such as live seafood, fresh 
fruit, fresh vegetables, etc., is highly dependent on the geograph-
ical locations. Especially in Hong Kong, most of the fruit and 
vegetables are imported from America or Southeast Asia and 
some high quality seafood, for example, lobster, fish fin and 
crab, is coming from Australia. Similar cases are prevailing in 
China recently. Some of the largest third-party logistics services 
provider built up their own distribution centers in the major 
cities of China providing fresh product transportation services. 
There are a large variety of papers studying the importance of 
long distance transportation. For instance, paper [8] highlights 
that more than 485,000 truckloads of fresh fruit and vegetables 
leave California every year. Revenues and costs for shipping 
these loads were determined for shipments going to five cities: 
Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver and New York City. Obvi-
ously, the long distance transportation faces a high risk. Due 
to the perishability and time passed, the products will have a 
certain degree of decay or deterioration. As indicated by [9], 
"All fresh products continue to deteriorate with time, even un-
der optimum handling and transport conditions. Post harvest 
1 
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and transport times should be kept as short as possible, espe-
cially under less than optimum conditions, to limit deterioration 
and extend marketable life of products." There are a lot of fac-
tors that influence the long distance transportation, for example, 
weather conditions, equipment breakdowns, transportation jam, 
etc. When such a case happen, the product will have a signif-
icant decay and deterioration during the transportation process. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to study on those products 
that have a very short lifespan. We build up three transportation 
discount incentive (TDI) schemes based on [4]'s model which 
has developed to capture the key features and concerns of sup-
ply chain management of fresh products involving long distance 
transportation. We will consider two scenarios: (1) The de-
centralized supply chain system, where the distributor and the 
producer make decisions to optimize their respective objectives; 
and (2) The centralized system, where the two parties make de-
cisions to optimize a joint objective. Under the TDI schemes, 
the two parties in the decentralized supply chain could be moti-
vated to make coordinated decisions so that the joint objective 
is optimized and all of them will be better off. 
Meanwhile, We also develop a model including a Third-Party 
Logistics (3PL) provider who helps the producer arrange the 
shipping issue. Currently, more and more customers complain 
about the delay of the product arrival time. Especially for per-
ishable products, the longer the time, the lower the quality is. 
For simplicity, we assume the product perishability directly re-
lates to the transportation time, which may be affected by the 
scheduling of 3PL provider. The product decay and deterio-
ration will be captured using similar form to [4] and [5]. And 
the transportation cost will be paid by the distributor. The 3PL 
provider will offer a guaranteed arrival time to the distributor. If 
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the product arrives late, the 3PL provider will pay some penalty 
cost to the distributor to eliminate the transportation risk faced 
by the distributor. The main problem that we investigate is the 
supply chain involving three parties, the producer, the distrib-
utor and the 3PL provider. The whole supply chain is dealing 
with the long distance transportation of fresh products. We will 
study all the optimal decisions for the three parties involved in 
the supply chain system. Moreover, we also explore our research 
in the supply chain coordination area. That is, the producer will 
propose a wholesale pricing policy to the distributor for all the 
unit purchased. And the distributor will try to sign a contract 
with the 3PL provider, which indicates the penalty cost suffered 
by the 3PL provider. 
This thesis is closely related to the supply chain management 
of perishable products. An early work describing the perish-
able inventory problem is done by [20] where the products de-
teriorating at the end of the storage periods were considered. 
Since then, more and more scholars starts their attention to the 
research on the perishability of the product. [10] provides a 
comprehensive survey of the research results published before 
the 1980s, where the perishable products lifetime were classified 
into two groups: fixed and random. Recent studies on the dete-
riorating product models can be found in [14] and [7]，s reviews, 
where the relevant literature published in 1980s and 1990s was 
reviewed respectively. The major concern of these literature is 
either focus on the quantity loss or the value drop. While [15 
considers both the quantity loss and value drop. Referring to 
paper [4], it describes a perishable product supply chain which 
faces long distance transportation. The demand of the model is 
random and price sensitive. And the quantity loss will affect the 
effective supply and the value drop will affect the correspond-
ing demand. [4] points out that the decentralized supply chain 
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losses significant expected profit compared with the centralized 
system because of the independent decision making. Then, [4 
proposes an incentive scheme which consists of a wholesale price 
discount contract and a buy back contract so as to facilitate the 
coordination issues. 
The supply chain coordination has been a hot research sub-
ject for the last few decades. One line of the literature is usu-
ally achieved through contracts between the upstream producers 
and downstream distributors, to increase the total supply chain 
profit so that the decentralized supply chain acts closely to the 
case of the centralized supply chain. Various models of sup-
ply chain contracts have been developed in the literature. Price 
discount is often suggested as an incentive to facilitate coordina-
tion. (see [13]，[18] and [19] ). Other incentive schemes include 
quantity commitment (see [6]), buy back or return policies (see 
12]), revenue sharing (see [2]), sales rebate or markdown al-
lowance (see [17]) and paper [3] provides an excellent survey on 
supply chain coordination with contracts. 
As was mentioned in the introduction, this paper is a continuum 
of paper [4] and [5]. In paper [4], the supply chain coordination 
is achieved through a wholesale price discount contract and a 
buy back contract. In our thesis, we try to explore to use one 
contract which only relates to the transportation time and the 
shipping quantity to induce the coordination strategy. Paper [5 
develops a supply chain model involving 3PL provider. The dif-
ference of our thesis is that we introduces a guaranteed arrival 
time as the 3PL provider's decision, while paper [5] sets the 3PL 
provider's transportation cost as the decision variable. Mean-
while, our thesis continue to use the FOB business model like 
paper [4], which the transportation cost is paid by the distribu-
tor, while paper [5]'s transportation cost is paid by the producer. 
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Section 2, we discuss the details of our basic model and some 
basic results done by paper [4]. Following section 2, we will 
introduce different TDI schemes in section 3. And the 3PL lo-
gistics provider formulation, notation and assumptions will be 
introduced in section 4. Section 5 conducts some computational 
studies for the comparison of TDI schemes and the schemes with 
the 3PL provider. Finally, the conclusion will be stated in sec-
tion 6. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 2 
Problem Description and 
Preliminary Results 
We investigate the following model. A producer sells the perish-
able product to a distributor. Decay and deterioration may take 
place during transportation, which reduce the quantity and the 
quality of the product. The product is highly perishable and 
the salvage value will be zero if it can not be sold within the 
lifespan. The time period of the product lifespan is defined as 
a single time period. Meanwhile, the product faces a long dis-
tance transportation whose cost is paid by the distributor. So 
the transaction between the producer and distributor is based 
on free-on-board (FOB). The distributor has to determine two 
decisions: the order quantity from the producer and the selling 
price to the end customer in the market. The producer has to 
determine the wholesale price based on the order quantity from 
the distributor. 
The product is fully fresh when it is loaded to the cargo ship. 
There exists a perishable duration 丁 which states the product 
is fresh within the r time period, where r > 0. After that, the 
product starts to decay at a significant rate. We define 6{t) as 
the freshness level of the product. 9{t) = 1 when t < 丁 and 
0 < 0{t) < 1 otherwise. And a function m(t) is defined over 
6 
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0,1] as the index on the marketable quantity of the product at 
time t. t is random in the model. 
Consider a product with uncertain and price-sensitive demand 
during a single selling period or season. Assume that demand 
for the product, denoted by D，has the following multiplicative 
functional form: 
D(p) = y(p) . 6 (2.1) 
where y(p) is a deterministic and decreasing function of the 
product's selling price p, and 6 is a random factor with CDF 
F('), PDF /(•). Then let y(p) take the form of 
y(p) = ap-^e{t) where a > 0, 6 > 1. (2.2) 
where b is a price-elastic index and a is a fixed constant. We fo-
cus on price-elastic products by assuming 6 � 1 . (If 6 < 1, then 
we can show that the optimal price under consideration goes to 
infinity.) In addition, we also assume Ct is the transportation 
cost per unit, w is the wholesale price per unit, c is the produc-
tion cost per unit for the producer, q is the order quantity of 
the distributor and p, q, w are decision variables. 
2.1 Traditional Decentralized Supply Chain 
In the decentralized supply chain, the producer needs to deter-
mine the wholesale price and the distributor needs to determine 
the order quantity and the selling price to the customer. The 
producer and distributor will maximize their expected profits 
independently. The distributor's expected profit is: 
qd\t) = pEe[min{qdm{t), D{p,t))] - wQd — Om (2.3) 
Where Qd is the order quantity and p is the selling price in the 
decentralized supply chain. In the situation where there is no 
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coordination between the producer and the distributor, the dis-
tributor is to determine p and qd by maximizing his expected 
profit TTdip, qd), where 
沉dip, Qd) 二 Et{7Td{p, qd\t)} (2.4) 
Following [11], this paper uses the stock factor z which defines 
as qdm{t)/[ap~^0{t)]. By substituting p = {za9{t)/ 
into equation 2.3, the distributor's objective function can be 
rewritten as: 
兀 刺 彻 ’ 力 ) = ( 鐵 ) " 〜 加 夢 ⑴ } } - ( 帖 
‘ ^ (2.5) 
The paper [4] states the following lemma for the optimal stock 
factor. 
Lemma 2.l[Cai et al, 2008] The optimal stocking factor 
z that maximizes 7T(i{z\qd,t) is determined by 
^^[z -八(z)] = - F{z)] (2.6) 
where 
A � = 
Moreover, if e has a generalized increasing failure rate, and 
lima;^oo —厂(工)]=0， then equation 2.6 has a unique so-
lution Zq. 
Prom equation 2.6, we see that the optimal stock factor is de-
pendent on the price-elasticity index b and e which shows the 
market fluctuation, but independent of other parameters. Then 
the optimal selling price is obtained by: 
烟 纖 ) " 。 （2.7) 
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By substituting p*(gd, t) of into 2.3, the distributor's expected 
profit given time period t is: 
TTdiqdlt) = 7rd{p*{qd^t)\qd,t) (2.8) 
= 占 [ a 外力 ) ] i / 6 4 � m � ] — F{z,)\ 
(2.9) 
The distributor is to maximize his expected profit 兀“⑷)： 
= Et{nd{qd\t)} (2.10) 
Paper [4] has already got the following optimal solutions for 
the producer and distributor. The distributor's optimal order 
quantity is: 
Qd 二 似 0 广,^KqY 
Ct 
Where Kq = £；亡{(9(亡)1/办m(t)i—“办}. The corresponding optimal 
expected profit is: 
兀广 6 - 1 h l T T ^ ^ ] (2.11) 
For the producer, the expected profit is: 
TTm 二 {W — 
Ct + u) 
And the optimal wholesale price is: 
* bc + Or 
We define the total expected supply chain profit as the summa-
tion of the producer's and distributor's profit. After applying 
w*, gj and p*，we can get the optimal expected profits for the 
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producer ttJ and distributor tt^ respectively. 
一 Ct + c [1 - F(zo)](b - 1 ) , 
〜 - ( 6—1 ) 2 [ 5(Ct + c )刷 ( 2 . 1 3 ) 
2.2 Centralized Supply Chain 
In the centralized supply chain, the producer and retailer are 
treated as a joint party. And the expected profit function of the 
centralized supply chain is: 
TTciqc) = ^tMqdt)} 
=^tlPciQc, t)min(qcm(t), B(p*(gc, t),t))] - (Ct + c)qc 
Where Qc is the order quantity and t) is the selling price. 
Note that the optimal selling price depends on the time t and 
the order quantity q � a n d based on definition of the stock fac-
tor, = {za6{t)/qm{t)Y/^. Paper [4] has figured out the 
optimal order quantity and expected profit respectively: 
= (2.14) 
TTc = 占 ― + CV)[1 二 : W (2.15) 
Until now, we have already figured out the optimal decisions for 
both the producer and distributor in centralized and decentral-
ized supply chain system respectively. As mentioned before, we 
define the total decentralized supply chain profit as the sum-
mation of the producer's and the distributor's profits. In the 
centralized supply chain, the total profit is observed by equa-
tion 2.15. For the decentralized supply chain, the total expected 
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profit 7r*^ tal is as follows: 
Ktal = K + ^d 
< TTc 
We can see that the decentralized supply chain can not reach the 
centralized supply chain profit since the producer and distribu-
tor make their decisions independently instead of joint decision 
making in the centralized system. 




This chapter is to introduce three Transportation Discount In-
centive (TDI) Schemes to encourage the decentralized supply 
chain distributor's order quantity up to the centralized supply 
chain order amount. Then the whole supply chain gets coordi-
nated. 
3.1 TDI Scheme I 
The first scheme is dealing with the transportation cost. Orig-
inally, if the distributor orders q amount of the products, the 
transportation fee that he should pay will be CV * <7. Now we let 
the producer compensate part of the transportation cost paid 
by the distributor. The detailed scheme is like follows. 
� T ( a ， … — (3.1) 
Ct — ocq i\ q> q 
\ 
q is the decision variable in this scheme, we assume that there 
exist a g, which defines the cutting point of the scheme. When 
q < q, the distributor will get a amount of compensation per 
unit ordered. Otherwise, the transportation cost will be fixed 
12 
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to (Ct — caq) per unit. 
From paper [4], we have already figured out the optimal selling 
price depends on the time t and the order quantity q and based 
on definition of the stock factor, p*(qs,t) = { z a O { t ) / . 
t) and Qs are the selling price and order quantity under 
the TDI scheme I. 
3.1.1 Optimal Order Quantity for q < q 
Let's focus on q < q case first. The retailer's expected profit 
under the transportation scheme tt^^Qs) should be equal to: 
Then 
<{qs) = Et{7TM{Qs.t)\q,t)} 
=Et\pl{qs, t)min{qsm{t), D{pl{qs, t),t)] -w*qs 
-{CT - OLqs)qs 
= — F(zo)j — (Ct - ag^ + w”qs 
Lemma 3.1 Let 7(^5) be the function of the first derivative 
of function 7r^(gs). 7(^5) is strictly convex. 
Proof The first derivative of function tt彻s) should be 
• = 響 （3.2) 
=a ' /^z^^Rol l _ - w * - C T - h 2ag,(3.3) 
If the function 7(^5) is strictly convex, it must satisfy the first 
and second order conditions. 
M ^ s ) = 赞 = - ^ a ' / ' z ^ ^ ' K o l l — F ( z � ) ] g，-1 + 2a (3.4) 
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Where X(qs) is the first order condition function of j(qs)-
d X j q s ) = 炉 7 � (3.5) 
dqs dql ‘ 
= 1 * ^ “ 1 / 、 广 - > 0 (3.6) 
0 0 
we can see that since ^ ^ ^ > 0, the original function X{q) is a 
monotonously increasing function. Meanwhile, when Qs — +oo, 
lim7(gs) > 0 and when Qs — 0, lim7(gs) > 0. And based 
on equation 3.6, we draw the conclusion that 7(g) is a strictly 
convex function which completes the proof. 
• 
When the first order condition of 7(^5) equals to zero, the cor-
responding minimum point q^  is observed as follows. 
a — 
^ 2ab 
We have already known that 7(^5) is a convex function. Now 
we discuss the possible situations for tt彻s). There are two pos-
sible situations for function 7(gs). One is 7(gO) > 0, the other 
is 7(gO) < 0. 
When 7(gO) > 0, we see that all the 7 � values are nonnega-
tive, which illustrates that TT^ {qs) will be an increasing function 
with respect to Qs. Then the optimal order quantity q* will be 
obtained when g* = q. 
When 7(gO) < 0, figure 3.1 illustrates the possible function of 
7(^5) and the corresponding 7T^{qs)- There exists a qi{a) and 
q2�,which divided vr彻s) into three parts. When qi(a) > g, 
the optimal order quantity should be q. While qi(a) < g and 
< 兀》Oh), (fs =仍0). Otherwise, q^ = q. 
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y(q) 
V 
� q i : \ : / : q2 q 
劝q) f 丨 \ L / 丨 / 
祝 … I / 
i ！ • 
0 qi c\2 q 
Figure 3.1: 7(g) with two intersection points with x-axis 
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Now we summarized the results for q < q. When > 0, 
二 q. When 7(9。）< 0, 
‘q if � > q 
q*s = 奶 0 ) if 仍 < Q and < n'^iqi) (3.7) 
q if qi{a) < q and n純 > 
Lemma 3.2 The optimal qi{a) will exist and unique when 
the following constraint achieves. 
+ > - + Ikq 
0 — 1 b 
Proof The necessary and sufficient condition for the unique-
ness of optimal order quantity qi is ^{q^) < 0 . 
/ 0 � l/b i/fefi cv �”ir仅 1Z�Y�1 — * 
7(<7 ) = Ci^ Zq^ [1-F{zo)][——L � " h i — 川 
Zab 
— + 作 - 释 。 内 
2ab 
I O n . 产 0 " 卞 - 作 0 ) ] � 杀 * “ 
+ za ： f'+i — w — Ct 
2ab 
= i ^ o —击 ( 2 a a 6 z o )击 [ 1 _ F (卻 ) ]击 + 
- 占 ( c + O r X O 
This completes the proof. 
• 
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3.1.2 Optimal Order Quantity forq>q 
If the order quantity exceeds the cutting point q, the transporta-
tion cost per unit Ct to the distributor will be fixed at [CT — ocq). 
The distributor's objective function will change to: 
TTK^ S) = Et\plmin{qsm{t),D{pl,t)] - w*qs - CTQS (3.8) 
Lemma 3.3 when q > q, the optimal order quantity in such 
situation g**(Q；) will be: 
Cio^) = 1 - F — K o ] ' (3.9) 
Ct — 0!q -j- w* 
And the corresponding expected profit is: 
_ w'^  + C T - a q , 1 - Fjzp) ^^  ^^  
沉 d =。卻 r i rTT^ =^0 (3.10) 
0 — 1 w* CT — o^ q 
Proof We know that the optimal order quantity should sat-
isfy the first and second order condition of equation 3.8. 
^ = a i / % i / � [ l — 严 + … ( 3 . 1 1 ) 
^ ^ = - p / � r i ^ o [ l - F ( z � ) ] c i / H < 0 (3.12) 
Therefore tt彻s) is concave in qs, and the optimal order quantity 
g**(Q；) that maximizes tt^^Qs) is determined by setting equation 
3.11 equal to zero where we get equation 3.9. After substitut-
ing the optimal order quantity into equation 3.8, we get 
equation 3.10. This completes the proof. 
• 
Until now, the optimal order quantity q: can be summarized as 
follows: 
g; = <h， i f � * � 〈 《 ； （3.13) 
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3.1.3 Inducing Coordination 
We have already figured it out that the optimal order quantity 
q* will be equal to gi(a), q or Now we take q* = qi{a) 
into consideration first. In this case, the optimal order quantity 
ql is a function of the discount factor a, which here, we denotes 
as Prom equation 3.3, we get the optimal order quantity 
g*(a) should satisfy 
qAa) = azo——— 厂 (3.14) 
by setting the first order condition equal to zero. Under the 
(TDI) scheme, the producer's objective function will be: 
= (w-c)q: (a)-aq:(a)2 (3.15) 
Without this scheme, the system turns to be a typical decen-
tralized supply chain whose producer's profit is acquired from 
equation 2.12. Now we define a function which stands 
for the producer's expected profit difference between the supply 
chain system without the scheme (equation 2.12) and with the 
scheme (equation 3.15). 
= … * - -(川* - 。[[丄 _ 卞^二；^二 ”、石 
- a q : ( a f (3.16) 
When the whole supply chain gets coordinated, the optimal or-
der quantity should be equal to the centralized supply chain 
order amount. By setting q*(a) = q*, we can get the optimal a, 
denoted as a*. 
Y = 纖 （3.17) 
Where q* can be obtained from equation 2.14. So under the op-
timal discount a*, the distributor's optimal order quantity will 
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be equal to the centralized supply chain optimal order amount. 
Lemma 3.4 Under the optimal a*, the producer acts better 
than the case without the TDI scheme. 
Proof a* is the point that can make the optimal order quan-
tity up to g*. When we insert a* into we get: 
= (w - c)q:{an - {w - - aq:{a*f 
={w - c)q,{a ) - {w - c ) a z o [ ^ ] 
-喻*^  
= — F{zo))Ko]\c + Ct)"^ 
0 — 1 
c + Cr (1 - F(zo))i^o , 1 b - 1 , 
=TZT�:�丨 c + cv ] _ (丁)] 
We know that l im“oo( l + ：^)—办=e, then l i m “ o o ( 早 = 
Meanwhile we find the first order condition of is always 
larger than zero, so it is a monotonously increasing function. 
And when b ^ oo, gets its maximum value which is e—i w 
1/2.72. Then is always larger than zero. The producer 
acts better under the TDI scheme compared to the traditional 
decentralized supply chain system. 
• 
Lemma 3.5 Under the optimal a*, the distributor also acts 
better than the case without the TDI scheme. 
Proof Similar to lemma 3.4，we define as the differ-
ence of the expected profit on the distributor side before and 
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after using the TDI scheme. 
A , ( a ) = ^ a " W / ^ ? r � g : i - " 6 [ l —厂⑷]— 
(3.18) 
After insert g*(a) = g*, we get: 
眷 伊 ] ( 3 . 1 9 ) 
Following lemma 3.4，we can easily get ( 罕 广 i < which 
makes Ad(a) > 0 for all 6 > 1. This illustrates that the TDI 
scheme makes the distributor earn more than the case without 
the scheme. The proof is completed. 
• 
Lemma 3.6 Under the optimal a* of the TDI scheme, the 
total supply chain profit will be equal to the centralized supply 
chain profit. 
Proof We define the total decentralized supply chain profit 
as the summation of the producer's and the distributor's profits. 
Under the transportation discount factor a*, the total supply 
chain profit is described as follows. 
^total — ^m + ^d 
= (川 * - c ) 綱 + 占 � 1 / 乂 / � > ” 1 - " ’ — F(zo)]Ko 
- + — 
= ； ^ a i / y � 卞 - F ( z o ) ] K o - ( c + CtK 
= 伪 + ⑶ 占 
二 TTc 
Then the optimal a* not only makes the optimal order quantity 
up to q*, but also makes the total supply chain profit equal to 
the centralized system's profit. 
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• 
For the case of the optimal order quantity equal to q, we can 
simply let q — ql- And then, we can easily follow lemma 3.4, 
3.5 and 3.6 to proof that, under the optimal discount factor a*, 
the producer and distributor act better than before. Meanwhile, 
the total supply chain profit under the TDI scheme in this case 
is equal to the profit of the centralized system. 
Through the previous two cases, we have already obtained that 
the supply chain can achieve coordination when a = a* and 
q — q^. The last case of the optimal order quantity is equal 
to By setting *^*(q：) = q*^ we get the optimal discount 
factor a**. 
** c + Ct 
ry = 
q{b — 1) 
Lemma 3.7 Under the optimal a** of the TDI scheme, the 
producer has no motivation to offer the scheme to the distributor 
for the coordination given that q = q^. 
Proof Referring to equation 3.16，after we insert a** and 
Q = Qc^  we get: 
A , �= K — e ) � > ) - - 咖 卻 [ 1 1 — "； 
0 — q 0 
- a g : > ) 2 
= - ( 明 < ° 
The above result shows that the producer has to loss some po-
tential profit in order to increase the distributor's optimal order 
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quantity up to q*. Then the producer has no motivation to do 
such coordination work. This completes the proof. 
• 
3.2 TDI Scheme II 
Scheme II is based on the model discussed in chapter 2. We 
have known that the decentralized supply chain profit can not 
reach the centralized one. Scheme II is to provide two parts of 
compensation by the producer to the distributor: 
1. A quantity loss and freshness level compensation contract, 
under which the producer shares portion of the quantity 
and freshness risk that the distributor has to face due to 
deterioration and decay of the product during the long dis-
tance transportation; 
2. A compensation contract (similar to the traditional buy-
back contract), under which the producer compensates the 
distributor certain amount for any unsold unit of the prod-
uct. 
Specifically, the products will arrive at the distributor side at 
time period t. The quantity and freshness level compensation 
contract suggests: 
P{q,t) - " V " " " —c—Or]} (3.20) 
Where l3{q, t) is the quantity and freshness level compensation 
factor decided by the producer, and qi is a constant taking value 
in (0,1), which we will discuss later in this section. And this part 
of the compensation amount is as follows: 
力 )” （3.21) 
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Lemma 3.8 The compensation factor l3{q,t) is an increas-
ing function with respect to time period t and order quantity q. 
Proof The first order condition w.r.t q and t are as follows: 
^ ^ ^ 二 。 叩 ) 严 m � H / V " H � 0 (3.22) 
^ = - — ) 1 � - 1 / 6 
+(1 - 1 / 6 ) 叩严 m � — ( 3 . 2 3 ) 
at 
We have known that m(t) and 0{t) are both decreasing function 
w.r.t time period t. Then we get equation 3.23 is larger than 
zero, which indicates that f5{q^t) is an increasing function to 
t. And equation 3.22 shows the increasing property to q. This 
completes the proof. 
• 
Obviously, we have to ensure that the compensation amount 
from the producer to the distributor should be positive. Oth-
erwise the compensation amount will be trivial. This is well 
demonstrated by the definition of the selling price based on the 
optimal stock factor. As known before, 
, 二 [ a 講 ) i / b 
qdm{t) 
then, the compensation amount can be rewritten as 
P{q->t) = [w - c - ai[(jpm(t) — c - Ct]} 
CHAPTER 3. TRANSPORTATION DISCOUNT INCENTIVE SCHEMElb 
When m(t) is very small, the selling price will be extremely large 
to make it possible for the compensation to be positive. Mean-
while, for any unit of the product that the distributor has failed 
to sell in the market, the producer compensates the distributor 
an amount v as follows: 
V = aip (3.24) 
Lemma 3.9 Under the quantity and freshness level compen-
sation and the compensation of equation 3.24, the distributor 
will order the quantity q* for any 0 < ai < 1. 
Proof It is obvious that the optimal stock factor that max-
imizes TTdiq^ t) should be zq. Then under the two parts of the 
TDI scheme II，the distributor's profit is as follows: 
7rd(g,t) = pE^[min{qm{t), D{p, t))] - wq - CtQ 
+/^(g，t)q + ”馳m�—D�p, t)]+} 
=pEe[min{qm{t), D{p, t))] — wq — CtQ 
TTlyt) Q — C — Cj"! 
+”丑⑴ — i ^ ( p ， ; 0 ] + } 
= ( 1 - ai)\pqm{t) — cq — Grq. 
-{I - a,)vE,{[qm{t) - D{p,t)Y} 
^ {I-OLi)T[c{q^) 
Thus, the optimal solution g* that maximizes tTc optimizes i^ d 
as well. That is, if the producer applies the two parts of the 
compensation scheme discussed above, the distributor will order 
up to Qc. Then the whole supply chain gets coordinated. This 
completes the proof. 
• 
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3.3 TDI Scheme III 
In scheme II, the whole supply chain gets coordinated through 
two different compensation contracts. Scheme III is to investi-
gate whether we can achieve the coordination purpose through 
only one contract. The proposed new incentive scheme suggests 
that: 
A(q,t)=秘一c + a2{c + (7:r-(az6>(t))i/�-i/^n(f)i— 
- F(zo) + r-f(x)dx]} (3.25) 
Where A(q, t) is the compensation amount offered by the pro-
ducer for every unit of the product ordered by the distributor. 
0^ 2 is a constant taking value in (0,1). The TDI compensation 
only depends on the arrival time t and the order quantity q. 
Lemma 3.10 The compensation amount A(g, t) is an increas-
ing function with respect to time period t and order quantity q. 
Proof The first order condition of t) w.r.t q and t are 
showed as follows: 
*[1 — F{zo) + r-f{^)dx] > 0 (3.26) 
^ ^ = - a 2 ( a z � ) i / V " 1 l - + f ⑷ 圳 
彻i/b—i 学 爪 ⑴ 1— 
— > 0 (3.27) 
We have known that m(t) and 0(t) are both decreasing function 
w.r.t time period t. Then we can easily see that the above first 
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order condition to t is larger than zero, which induces A(q, t) 
is increasing in t. Equation 3.26 also proves that A(g,t) is in-
creasing in q. These complete the proof. 
• 
Lemma 3.11 Under the TDI compensation scheme described 
in equation 3.25，the distributor will order the quantity ql for 
any 0 < 0^ 2 < 1. 
Proof Under the TDI scheme III，the distributor's profit is 
as follows: 
兀 = pE^[min{qm{t), D{p, t))] - wq - CtQ + ^{q, t)q 
—pEe[min{qm{t), t))] — wq — CtQ 
+{w-c + a2{c + Ct- ( a 之 外 力 ⑴ 1—i/b * 
[l-F{zo)+r-f{x)dx]}}q 
川 Zq 
= ( 1 — a2)lpgm(t) — cq — Cjq^ 
—丄]+ — a2F{zo) 
+0^2 L ‘ —f{x)dx} 
川 Zq 
= ( 1 — a2)\pqm{t) — cq — Crq] 
二 (l-a2)7ra(q,t) 
Thus, the optimal solution q* that maximizes tTc optimizes rcd as 
well. That is, if the producer applies the compensation scheme 
discussed in equation 3.25, the distributor will order up to g � 
Then the whole supply chain gets coordinated. This completes 
the proof. 
• 
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Similar to TDI II, the compensation offered by the producer 
should be positive amount to the distributor. Based on the 
illustration of TDI II of the relationship between the optimal 
selling price and the marketable quantity factor m⑴，we can 
easily obtain the positive compensation amount. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Third-party Logistics 
This chapter is to introduce a third-party logistics (3PL) provider 
to help the producer transport the products to the distributor 
side. The whole supply chain will include three parties. The 
optimal decisions faced by the 3PL provider, the producer and 
the distributor in the decentralized supply chain are studied re-
spectively in this chapter. Based on the optimal decisions in the 
centralized supply chain as a benchmark, we propose a whole-
sale price policy between the producer and the distributor, and a 
transportation penalty factor offered by the 3PL provider to the 
distributor, to make the decentralized supply chain coordinated. 
4.1 3PL Problem Formulation 
We investigate the following problem. A producer transports by 
a third-party logistics provider a certain quantity of fresh prod-
uct to a distant market. The product shipped has to undergo 
long distance transportation before it reaches the market. The 
transportation cost is paid by the distributor, which is compati-
ble to the formulation discussed in chapter 2. The 3PL provider 
will set a guaranteed arrival time to to the distributor. If the 
product can not reach the distributor side within to, the 3PL 
provider will pay certain amount of the penalty. The penalty 
28 
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is related to the transportation cost per unit which takes the 
following form: 
Ct - a^it - h Y ""(4.1) 
Where 0^ 3 is the penalty factor describing the amount the 3PL 
provider has to pay when the transportation time delays. For 
the producer and distributor, all the parameters are consistent 
with chapter 2. For our convenience, table 4.1 lists all the nota-
tion in this chapter. 
Without loss of any generality, we assume the salvage value of 
any product left unsold is zero since it is highly perishable. Also 
we do not consider any shortage cost. All the information is 
assumed to be common knowledge and all the decision makers 
are risk-neutral with the objective to maximize their expected 
profit. To proceed, we summarize the business sequence in de-
tail. ( l )The producer will offer a wholesale price to the distribu-
tor and 3PL provider; (2)Based on the wholesale price, the 3PL 
provider will propose a guaranteed arrival time; (3)The distrib-
utor determines the purchasing quantity and selling price after 
he obtains the wholesale price and the guaranteed arrival time. 
The optimization problems of the distributor, 3PL provider, and 
the producer are listed as follows: 
• The distributor's decision includes the selling price and the 
purchasing quantity. After obtaining the guaranteed arrival 
time 力0 from the 3PL provider and the wholesale price from 
the producer, the distributor's purpose is to maximize its 
own expected profit 7rd(P, 亡0，妳 
兀d(P’％| ‘�=vEt^^{m%n[qdm{ t ) , D{p,t)]} - wqd 
- E t { C T - a S - h y } q d (4.2) 
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Table 4.1: List of notation. ,, 
Symbol Description 
T Fresh duration of the product; 
t The transportation time distributed over [j,k], follow uniform 
distribution with PDF g(.) and CDF G(.)； 
9{t) Freshness index of the product, with transportation time t; 
m(t) Marketable quantity of the product, with transportation 
time t; 
b The price elasticity of the market demand; 
e Random fluctuations of the demand, with 
PDF f(.) and CDF F(.); 
p The selling price set by the distributor, a decision variable; 
D(p，t) The market demand when selling price is p and freshness 
level is e{t)\ 
c Unit manufacturing cost of the producer; 
ci Unit transportation cost of the 3PL provider; 
0；3 The penalty factor offered by the 3PL provider; 
Ct Unit fixed transportation cost of the 3PL provider; 
Qd The shipping quantity of the distributor, a decision variable-, 
to The guaranteed arrival time set by the 3PL provider, 
a decision variable] 
w The wholesale price offered by the producer, a decision variable; 
ttzpl[-) The expected profit function of the 3PL provider; 
TTmi-) The expected profit function of the producer; 
TTdC) The expected profit function of the distributor; 
Qc The shipping quantity in the centralized supply chain; 
Pc The selling price in the centralized supply chain; 
TTc The expected entire chain profit in the centralized supply chain. 
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where Qd is the purchasing quantity, which is influenced by 
the wholesale price w and the guaranteed arrival time to-
• Considering the 3PL provider who needs to determine the 
guaranteed arrival time 亡0，its goal is to maximize the ex-
pected profit 7r3PL(亡0，％(秘,力0)): 
兀3尸L(力0’ Qd—, k ) ) = EtiCr - 力—力o)+ - c i } * qd�w, to) 
(4.3) 
Where to) is the shipping quantity of the 3PL provider, 
which is influenced by the wholesale price and the guaran-
teed arrival time to. 
• The producer needs to determine the wholesale price with 
the objective to maximize its expected profit 7Tm{w): 
qd{w)) = {w- c)qd{w) (4.4) 
Where q d � w � i s the order quantity of the distributor when 
the 3PL provider has set the guaranteed arrival time to-
4.2 Optimal Decisions in the Decentralized 
Supply Chain 
In this section, we will characterize the optimal decisions of the 
3PL provider, the producer and the distributor in the decen-
tralized supply chain in which they seek to maximize their re-
spective profits. We will do so by using a backwards approach. 
First, we will derive the joint decisions of the distributor, given 
the transportation time, the arbitrary wholesale price and the 
guaranteed arrival time. Second, we analyze the 3PL provider's 
optimal guaranteed arrival time, given any wholesale price and 
the transportation time. Finally, based on the optimal decisions 
of the distributor and the 3PL provider, we derive the optimal 
wholesale price. 
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4.2.1 Optimal Decisions of the Distributor 
The distributor faces a joint purchasing quantity and pricing 
decision problem, given that the transportation time is t and the 
wholesale price w. Prom chapter 2, we have already obtained 
the stock factor z where 
. = ( 4 . 5 ) 
Then the problem of optimizing (q ,^ p) is converted into that 
of optimizing (qd, z). By inserting equation 4.5 into 4.2, the 
distributor's objective function can be rewritten as: 
TTdip, Qdlto) = t)]} 
—md — EtiCr — 0^ 3(t - kyjqd 
The optimal stock factor zq obtained in lemma 2.1 can also be 
applied to this model since the change of the transportation cost 
does not distort z. While through zq, we get p* = 
After substituting p* and zq into 4.2, we get: 
= ^(azoy^'Kog^'^'ll - F(zo)j 
- m d - EtiCr — -力0)+}% (4.6) 
Where Kq = 
Lemma 4.1 For any given wholesale price w of the producer, 
the distributor's optimal order quantity should be: 
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Proof The first and second order condition are as follows 
警 = — 。 广 爛 — w 
-Et{CT-a3[t-to]-^} 
^ ^ = 4 ( a z o ) i / W ” l - F ( z � ) ] < 0 
Therefore TTd(彻）is concave in qd, and the optimal order quan-
tity qS that maximizes nd{qd) is determined by the first order 
condition from which 4.7 is obtained. 
• 
Remark 1 
1. q^  decreases in the producer's wholesale price w. 
2. Since t follows uniform distribution in [j, k], we can rewrite 
equation 4.7 as: 
川十 UT 2{k-j) 
Through the first order condition of 4.8, we get 
k - ] 
Then we can easily see that the optimal order quantity q: 
decreases in to within [j, k . 
4.2.2 Optimal Decisions of the 3PL Provider 
We have already got the optimal order quantity q*^  in equation 
4.8，after insert the gj into equation 4.3, we get: 
W 力 0 ) = ICr - c. - 务 轉 私 } 
3 (4.9) 
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Lemma 4.2 Based on the 3PL provider's objective function 
4.9，the optimal guaranteed arrival time Q that maximizes the 
its own expected profit is: 
力。二 ' - 」 ^ ^ ^ (4.10) 
Proof Taking the first derivative with respect to 亡o, we have 
d-Kwiito) OLzitQ -k) ^ 
�1 —的 秘—G + WG —ci)} 
K — J 
(二； [to-k- y ^ ] [to-k^ v ^ ] 
Where n{w) -
Apparently, Tr^piito) increases before to reaches 
and starts to decrease after that point. Then the optimal guar-
anteed arrival time tj is obtained. This completes the proof. 
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• 
Remark 2 
1. To ensure that the optimal Q can be obtained, one impor-
tant assumption should be notified. 
w < (6 - 1)CT - bci (4.11) 
This makes t^  is valid. 
2. Iq increases in the wholesale price w. This illustrates that 
if the product is expensive, the 3PL provider will set the 
guaranteed arrival time higher to decrease his own risk for 
the delay of the transportation. 
3. Inserting the optimal t^  into the optimal order quantity 4.8, 
we get 
Qd = — — — ^ o ) .—7—. (4.12) 
W Ci 0 
4.2.3 Optimal Decisions of the Producer 
Referring to the objective function of the producer introduced 
in equation 4.4，after inserting the optimal order quantity q*这 of 
equation 4.12, we get 
TTmH = { w - c)az,{^ ~ (4.13) 
W + Ci 0 
Lemma 4.3 The producer's optimal wholesale price w* is 
* bc + ci 
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Proof Taking the first derivative with respect to w, we have 
^ = a 卻 { [ 1 - F ⑷ ] i ^ � } � ( ¥ ) > + c i ) - " 
^[{1 - b)w + ci i-be] (4.15) 
Obviously, we can see that TTmi'w) increases before w reaches ^ 
and starts to decrease after this point. Therefore, the optimal 
wholesale price that maximizes 7rm{w) is ^ f^ - This completes 
the proof. 
• 
After obtaining the optimal wholesale price w*, we insert it into 
the optimal order quantity 4.12 and guaranteed arrival time 
4.10. Then we get: 
d = a 卻 产 （4.16) 
to-片 \ as(b-l) 丄 
Remark 3 
1. w* is greater than c because 6 � 1，w h i c h guarantees that 
the producer always earns a positive profit. 
2. w* is decreasing in b, which implies that the producer 
should decrease his wholesale price if the market demand 
is more price-sensitive. 
3. Referring to the assumption illustrated in equation 4.11, 
after inserting the optimal wholesale price w*, we get: 
be + ci(62 — 6 + 1) < (6 — ifCr (4.18) 
Only when equation 4.18 satisfies does the optimal guaran-
teed arrival time t^  exist. 
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4. We can derive the optimal expected profit for the producer, 
distributor and the 3PL provider based on the optimal de-
cisions obtained in section 4.2. , 
• The producer's optimal expected profit is: 
兀 - = i ^ T * — ^ T ^ K � } 丨 ( 4 . 1 9 ) 
• The distributor's optimal expected profit is: 
兀d = ( 口 ) i ^ T * 似 丨 丁 ] 
(4.20) 
• The 3PL provider's optimal expected profit is: 
兀3PL = ^ ^ n y ^ * (4.21) 
Therefore, the relative profits of the three parties in the 
supply chain are as follows: 
TTm ： TTrf ： TTSPL = 1 ： { t ^ ? ’ (4-22) 
0 — 1 0 — 1 
Since 6 > 1，the ratio of the relative profits only depends 
on the price elasticity b. And also from the ratio, we know 
that TTm < ttspl < TTd. That is, without coordination, the 
distributor achieves the largest portion of the total chain 
welfare, whereas the producer achieves the smallest portion, 
especially when the price elasticity is small. 
4.3 Optimal Decisions in the Centralized Sup-
ply Chain 
The centralized supply chain, we mean the three parties of the 
decentralized supply chain are owned by one company, and there 
CHAPTER 4. THIRD-PARTY LOGISTICS 38 
exists a central decision maker who seeks to achieve the maximal 
expected profit of the entire supply chain. In that case, only two 
decisions need to be made. In the first stage, the order quantity 
to the distant market should be determined; and in the second 
stage, when the product arrives at the destination, the selling 
price which depends on the freshness level and quantity loss 
should be determined. To be different from the decentralized 
supply chain, we denote the order quantity and the selling price 
in the centralized system as q � a n d Pc. The profit function, 
denoted as tTc becomes 
TTcfe) == PcEe,t{miri[qm{t\ D{pc, t)]} — CQc - Ciq (4.23) 
Lemma 4.4 In the centralized supply chain, the optimal 
order quantity q* is given by 
ql 二 a z o [ l — f ( � ( 4 . 2 4 ) 
c + Ci 
And the corresponding optimal expected profit tt* is 
* c + ci 1 - F{zo) 
TT* = - - * azo——-^-^KoY (4.25) 
0 — 1 C + Ci 
Proof Prom equation 2.1, we can easily get 
测 = ( 纖 ) " 。 （4.26) 
Inserting 4.26 into 4.23，we transform the profit as the function 
of the order quantity g � 
兀cfe) = ^{azoY^'Koql-'^'il — F{zo)] — cq^ - c瓜(4.27) 
Apparently, tTc is concave in qc since b > 1. Therefore, the 
optimal order quantity is uniquely determined by the first order 
condition. Let 
— F(zo)] - c - a = 0 (4.28) 
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we get the optimal order quantity g* given by equation 4.24. 
After substituting equation 4.24 into 4.27, we have equation 
4.25. This completes the proof. 
• 
Remark 4 
1. The optimal order quantity in the centralized system is 
larger than that in the decentralized system: 
•  Q ： = ( 占 ( 4 . 2 9 ) 
This shows that the ration only depends on the price elas-
ticity of the market demand. Also (占严 is decreasing in 
b G (1, +oo). Therefore, the more sensitive the market 
demand to the selling price, the closer the optimal order 
quantity in the centralized supply chain to the decentral-
ized one. 
2. We define the total expected profit of the decentralized sup-
ply chain is tt；^  + ttJ + tt^pl. Denote c； = I - (tt^ + ttJ + 
t^Ipl)IT^l as the expected profit loss due to the lack of co-
ordination. Hence we have 
厂 1 <1 + 兀2 + 
《二丄 ： 
TT* 
= 1 - ( ¥ ) 2 " - ( ¥ 严 2 - (4.30) 
Through figure 4.1, we know that the profit loss, <;，is in-
creasing in k. That is, the more sensitive the market de-
mand is to a change in price, the more profit loss will be 
incurred due to the lack of coordination. 
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Profit Loss of the Decentralized Supply Chain 
70% 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6 0 % - ： 
50% - 广 -
§ 40% - / -
^ / 
^ 30% - -
2 0 % - -
10% -
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
Price Elasticity, b 
Figure 4.1: Relative Profit Loss between the Centralized and the Decentral-
ized System 
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4.4 Designing a Coordination Mechanism 
To make the decentralized fresh product supply chain coordi-
nated, two objectives should be reached: (1) the total profit of 
the 3PL provider, the producer and the distributor under the 
optimal decisions should be the same as that of the centralized 
system. (2) each party should be better off so that they are will-
ing to participate in the coordination. In our model, we notice 
that in the decentralized supply chain, the distributor gets the 
largest amount of the profit. While the producer get the smallest 
part. Therefore, to motivate the distributor order more prod-
ucts, the producer should offer incentive since the producer's 
expected profit is determined from the estimation of the order 
quantity of the distributor. Meanwhile, the 3PL provider needs 
to give the distributor some allowance since the transportation 
cost is paid by the distributor. And the allowance will encourage 
the distributor to order more so as to increase the 3PL provider's 
expected profit. Our proposed contracts will run in a sequential 
order: first the producer negotiates with the distributor and a 
wholesale pricing policy is determined; then the distributor ne-
gotiates with the 3PL provider so as to determine the penalty 
factor policy. Specifically: 
(1) Our wholesale pricing policy suggests that the distrib-
utor agrees to purchase all the producer's marketable quantity 
at which takes the following form: 
q 卻 
-c-ci} (4.31) 
Where q is the order quantity of the distributor, t is the realized 
transportation time, and is a constant within (0,1) which is 
determined in the negotiation process between the producer and 
the distributor. 
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(2) Our penalty factor policy suggests that the 3PL provider 
will offer some transportation allowance depending on the order 
quantity and the transportation time period. The penalty factor 
will take the following form: 
/ Ct- c i 
_ 力 ） = 
— ( 1 - � � H 〜 邮 ， 丄 ] 
(t - to) q 
" ( c + c i ) } (4.32) 
Where 7 is a constant taking value in (0, 1)，which is determined 
by the negotiation process between the distributor and the 3PL 
provider. We will do further analysis later in this section about 
the constant jS and 7 . 
Remark 5 
1. we can easily see that w(q,t) is strictly decreasing in the 
order quantity q for any t. This is similar to the traditional 
Quantity Discount where the wholesale price is decreasing 
in the distributor's purchasing quantity. Meanwhile, for 
any fixed q, w(q’t) is strictly decreasing in t. Therefore, if 
the transportation time becomes longer, the producer has 
to reduce his wholesale price to encourage the distributor 
to order more. 
2. The penalty factor policy takes the following form 
when t follows the uniform distribution within [j，k . 
/ .X r Ct — ci 
一 J � 
{k - toY q zo' 
- ( c + C i ) } } * 2 ( A : - j ) 
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Obviously, we can see that the penalty factor as is increas-
ing in the transportation time t for any order quantity. So 
the longer the shipping time, the more penalty the 3PL has 
to pay if the product does not arrive at the distributor side 
on time. Meanwhile, 0^ 3 is strictly increasing in q for any 
given time period t. Therefore, the 3PL provider is willing 
to take more penalty risk for the delay of the product so 
that the distributor can order more. 
Theorem 4.1 The wholesale pricing policy 4-31 together 
with the penalty factor policy 入.32 will induce the decentralized 
supply chain achieve the same performance as that of the central-
ized supply chain for any 7 G (0，1). Meanwhile, for the de-
centralized supply chain under 4-31 and 4-32, the expected profit 
shares of the 3PL provider, the producer and the distributor are 
(1 - (i)，t, (K and (1 - p){l - 7)^*. 
Proof It is easily to see that the optimal stock factor that 
maximizes the distributor's expected profit should be zq (refer 
to lemma 2.1). Therefore, after inserting equation 4.31 to the 
distributor's optimal profit function tt^ , we have 
= pE,{minlqm(t), D(p, t)] - w{q, t)q 
- E t { C T - a , { q , t ) { t - t , y } q 
= ( 1 - — 丄 ] - c — cr]q 
Q 
= ( 1 - / ^ ) ( 1 - 7 K * 
Next we investigate the producer's optimal profit tt^. Based on 
the wholesale pricing policy from equation 4.31 and the penalty 
factor of equation 4.32, we can easily get the following: 
心 (仏 =— (仏力 ) -咖 
= 州 ^ 严 爪 ⑴ 1 - 1 / 6 爪 叫 1 , 丄 ] - C — c,]q 
Q 
= P < 
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Finally, the 3PL provider's optimal profit TTgp^  will be obtained 
through the penalty factor policy from equation 4.32. 
爪‘肌={CT - t){t - TOY - ci}q •• 
= ( 1 -
Therefore the order quantity that maximizes tt^ , tt'讯 and n'^ pi 
equals to the optimal shipping quantity of the centralized supply 
chain q*. This completes the proof. 
• 
Until now, we know that the profit shares among the 3PL provider, 
the producer and the distributor are determined by the values 
of P and 7. Through negotiation, the producer's profit share {(5) 
is first determined, and the rest share (1-") goes to the distrib-
utor and the 3PL provider. After that, the distributor's and the 
3PL provider's profit share are determined. Generally speaking, 
the values of (5 and 7 are determined by the relative bargaining 
powers of the three parties involved in the supply chain. How-
ever, to ensure that each party is willing to participate in the 
coordination, a fundamental requirement is that each party will 
be better off. This results in a upper and a lower bound on jS 
and 7，as follows: 
{ ^ - ^ r < p < 1 - — 
1-/3^ b ) 1 b ) 
As can be seen from figure 4.2, the value of 7 that is ac-
ceptable to both the 3PL provider and the producer depends on 
the value of (5. When (5 grows, the acceptable range of 7 be-
comes narrower. This is due to the fact that the sharable profit 
(1 - /3)7r* shrinks. 
• End of chapter. 
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Figure 4.2: The Lower and Upper Bounds of (5 and 7 
Chapter 5 
Computational Studies 
5.1 Numerical Study of the 3PL Model 
We have conducted a series of computational study to evaluate 
the effect of different parameters to the optimal decisions. The 
numerical study can uncover the managerial insights that are 
not clear in the theoretical results. The experiment will focus 
on the effects of the fresh duration and the price elasticity b. 
Meanwhile, we also compare the two coordination mechanisms 
of TDI III and 3PL one which includes a wholesale pricing policy 
and the penalty factor policy. The parameters are defined as fol-
lows: the unit production cost c = 2 and the unit shipping cost 
ci = 1. And the unit transportation cost paid by the distributor 
CV = 8 and the penalty factor 0^ 3 = 2. The transportation time 
t is assumed to follow uniform distribution in [1,5]. The product 
decays through a constant exponential function m(t) = e-
and the value drop function 0{t)=已-0-2(t-”. In the demand 
function, a = 100 and the price elasticity h — 2. The random 
factor 6 follows a normal distribution with mean 1 and variance 
0.2. 
In the first group of the experiment, we change the fresh du-
ration from 2 to 4. For each r, we list the optimal decisions 
for both the decentralized and centralized supply chain. At the 
46 
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same time, we evaluate the profit loss and profit margin through 
different fresh durations. The results are showed in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Optimal Decisions under Different Fresh Durations 
T W* q*d TT: tt^pl QC K q 
2.00 5.00 0.71 3.00 2 . 1 3 ^ 1 1 . 3 6 34.07 56.25% 
2.25 5.00 0.77 3.00 2 . 3 0 ^ 1 2 . 2 4 36.73 56.25% 
2.50 5.00 0.82 3.00 2 . 4 7 ~ ~ ^ 4 . 9 5 13.20 39.59 56.25% 
2.75 5.00" 0.89 3.00 2.67 10.67 5.33 14.22 42.67 " 5 6 ^ 2 ^ 
3.00 5.00 "Q.96 3.00 2.87 11.50 5 . 7 5 1 5 . 3 3 46.00 56.25% 
3.25 5.00" 1.03 3.00 3.10 12.39 6.20 16.53 49.58 56.25% 
3.50 5.00 1.11 3.00 3.34 13.36 6 . 6 8 1 7 . 8 1 53.44 56.25% 
3.75 5.00 1.20 3.00 3.60 1 4 . 4 0 1 9 , 2 0 57.60 56.25% 
4.00 5.00 1.29 3.00 3.88 15.52 7 . 7 6 2 0 . 7 0 62.09 56.25% 
Observation I 
• Through table 5.1，we see that the order quantities, the 
expected profit for both the decentralized supply chain and 
centralized supply chain change in the same direction as 
the fresh duration. This is because the longer the fresh 
duration r is, the larger the remaining profit of the fresh 
product is after the long distance transportation. 
• Prom Table 5.1，we obtain that the profit loss will remain 
the same no matter how long the fresh duration T is. This is 
due to our risk neutral assumption on the involved parties. 
We conjecture that if considering the risk averse setting, 
the profit loss should be decreasing in the fresh duration. 
• According to table 5.1, the wholesale price, the guaranteed 
arrival time and the profit loss are unchanged with regard 
to the fresh duration since the price elasticity b is fixed. 
For the guaranteed arrival time, when the fresh duration is 
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short, the guaranteed arrival time may be larger than the 
fresh duration. This states that the 3PL provider can only 
guarantee the product's arrival with certain level of profit 
loss and value drop. 
The second group of experiment focus on the price elasticity. 
We change b from 2 to 3.4, and the optimal decisions for dif-
ferent parties in both decentralized and centralized system are 
summarized in table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Optimal Decisions under Different Price Elasticities 
—b I 叫 叫 叫 < I K TTjpL Qc K Ql/Qd ^ 
2 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 0 . 9 6 3 . 0 0 2 . 8 7 1 1 . 5 0 5 . 7 5 1 5 . 3 3 4 6 . 0 0 1 6 . 0 0 5 6 . 2 5 % 
2 . 2 0 4 . 5 0 1 . 0 7 1 . 8 9 2 . 6 8 ^ 1 5 . 4 1 3 8 . 5 3 1 4 . 4 0 5 6 . 9 7 % 
一 2 . 4 0 4 . 1 4 ~ 1 . 1 5 1 . 3 5 7 . 2 5 4 . 2 3 1 5 . 3 1 3 2 . 8 0 1 3 . 2 9 5 7 . 4 7 % 
2 . 6 0 3 . 8 8 1 . 2 0 1 . 0 2 2 . 2 4 5 . 9 2 3 . 6 4 1 4 . 9 3 2 7 . 9 9 1 2 . 4 9 5 7 . 8 3 % 
2 . 8 0 3 . 6 7 1 . 2 5 0 . 8 0 2 . 0 8 5 . 0 3 3 . 2 4 1 4 . 8 2 2 4 . 7 0 1 1 . 8 7 5 8 . 1 0 % 
3 . 0 0 3 . 5 0 1 . 2 6 0 . 6 4 1 . 8 9 4 . 2 5 ^ 1 4 . 3 4 2 1 . 5 1 1 1 . 3 9 5 8 . 3 0 % 
3.20 3.36 1.28 0.52 1 . 7 4 ^ ^ 1 4 . 0 5 19.16 11.00 58.46% 
3.40 3.25 1.27 0.43 1 . 5 9 ^ ^ 1 3 . 6 2 17.02 10.68 58.59% 
Observation II 
• As the market demand becomes more sensitive to the selling 
price, the wholesale price and the optimal order quantity 
will decrease significantly because of the lack of coordina-
tion. 
• The guaranteed arrival time is decreasing with respect to 
the b, this implies that the 3PL provider is eager to pro-
pose the shipping contract to the distributor with a shorter 
guaranteed arrival time when the market demand becomes 
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more price sensitive. This can be seen as a kind of moti-
vation to encourage the distributor using the 3PL provider 
to ship the product. 
• The expected profits of all the parties for both the decen-
tralized and centralized supply chain do strictly decrease 
in b. Hence, all of them should prefer a less price-sensitive 
market demand. 
• The profit loss is increasing in b because of the market 
competition among the three parties. Therefore, the more 
sensitive the demand is to the selling price, the more ben-
eficial the coordination of the three parties will be. 
5.2 Comparison between the Supply Chain 
with and without the 3PL provider 
In this section, we try to compare whether the distributor should 
select the 3PL provider to help him transport the product or 
just deliver the product by himself. Through the economy of 
scale, the 3PL provider normally will provide the transportation 
service better than the distributor himself. The 3PL provider's 
advantage mainly shows in two aspects. One is that the cost of 
transportation through the 3PL provider is lower than that of 
the distributor himself. The other is that the delivery time is 
shorter by the 3PL provider. Since that the 3PL provider needs 
to earn a portion of profit through the transportation service, 
his shipping price charged to the distributor should be higher 
than the shipping cost of the distributor himself. Through our 
computational study, we assume that the mean of the delivery 
time by the 3PL provider is 20% shorter than the distributor's 
transportation. Also, the cost of 3PL provider is 20% less than 
the distributor himself. Equivalently, we set t as the delivery 
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time for the 3PL provider. So the time for shipment by the 
distributor himself would be 0.8t. Also we set Or = 4 as the 
transportation cost by the distributor himself. Then the cost of 
3PL provider ci would be 3.2. The price of the transportation 
service by the 3PL provider CT should satisfy CT > CT. The 
computational study will be investigated through two aspects: 
the freshness level, quantity loss and the price elasticity index. 
The factor that we evaluate is the increase or decrease ratio 
with respect to the distributor's expected profit. For example, 
under the TDI scheme, the distributor will get x amount of the 
profit through delivering the product by himself. And in the 
3PL model, the distributor will get y amount of the profit. We 
define w as the increase or decrease ratio of the distributor's 




Figure 5.3 shows the effect of vo when the freshness level and 
the quantity loss level change. Recall that we have assumed 
that the freshness level and quantity loss are followed by the 
exponential distribution. To facilitate our study, we now set the 
freshness level and quantity loss function as follows: 
m(t) = e-o 务丁) 
Observation III 
• Prom table 5.3, we can see that as the factor oi and 02 
become larger, which means the product has a significant 
rate of the freshness level decay or quantity loss, the distrib-
utor's decreasing ratio starts to decrease. This is because 
that when the product gets decay or deterioration seriously, 
the 3PL's shipping advantages (e.g. less shipping time and 
lower shipping cost) become more efficient. Therefore, the 
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Table 5.3: The comparison with respect to the freshness level and quantity 
loss 
TDI Scheme 3PL Model 
Ql 02 K TtI < TT； T T；� T ^ I p l 贝 
0.20 ~ o I o " 2.17 1.09 0.54 0.74 0.19 0.37 3 1 . 6 7 ^ 
0.24 0.10 2.10 1.05 0.53 2.94 0.73 0 . 1 8 0 . 3 7 30.22% 
0.28 0.10 2.04 1.02 0.51 2.91 0.73 0 . 1 8 0 . 3 6 28.77% 
0.32 0.10 1.98 0.99 0.50 2.88 0.72 0 . 1 8 0 . 3 6 27.31% 
0.36 0.10 1.93 0.96 0.48 2.86 0.71 0 . 1 8 0 . 3 6 25.86% 
0.40 0.10 1.87 0.94 0.47 2.83 0.71 0 . 1 8 0 . 3 5 24.39% 
0.44 0.10 1.83 0.91 0.46 2.81 0.70 0 . 1 8 0 . 3 5 22.93% 
0.48 0.10 1.78 0.89 0.44 2.79 0.70 0 . 1 7 0 . 3 5 21.47% 
0.52 0.10 1.74 0.87 0.43 2.78 0.69 0 . 1 7 0 . 3 5 20.01% 
0.20 " o T r 2.09 1.04 0.52 ^ 9 3 0.73 0.18 0.37 29.86% 
0.20 " O ^ 1.94 0.97 0.48 0.72 0.18 0.36 26.22% 
0.20 0.35 1.81 0.91 0.45 2.81 0.70 0 . 1 8 0 . 3 5 22.57% 
0 . 2 0 0.45 1.71 0.85 0 . 4 3 2.77 0 . 6 9 0 . 1 7 0 . 3 5 18.91% 
0.20 " O ^ 1.62 0.81 0.40 0.68 0.17 0.34 1 5 . 2 ^ 
0.20 " O ^ 1.54 0.77 0.38 0.68 0.17 0.34 11.62% 
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3PL provider should be a better choice to the distributor if 
the product has serious value drop as time goes. 
• Another important insight through table 5.3 is that the dis-
tributor's expected profit will drop after using 3PL provider 
to ship the product. This relates to the original set up cost 
which we did not consider when doing the modeling in chap-
ter 3. Since if the distributor does the shipment by himself, 
the set up cost actually will be a large cost which affect the 
expected profit. Then, whether the distributor's expected 
profit decreases or increases, the set up cost should be in-
cluded. If the result of the distributor's expected profit 
deducting the set up cost is less than the expected profit 
obtained in the 3PL model, the 3PL provider should be 
the better choice to the distributor for the transportation 
services. Otherwise, the distributor will prefer to do the 
shipment by himself. 
• Some extreme cases are also worthy being discussed here. 
When the 3PL provider's shipping cost is far smaller than 
the distributor's own shipping cost, the distributor's ex-
pected profit in 3PL model will be larger than the other 
one even without considering the set up cost. At the same 
time, if the 3PL provider's shipping time is far shorter than 
the distributor's own shipping time, similar situation will 
happen as the smaller shipping cost one. Actually, in our 
real life, both of the above two situations are not practical. 
Observation IV 
• Prom table 5.4, we find that as the price elasticity becomes 
larger, the distributor's decreasing ratio starts to decrease. 
This is because when the product's demand is quite price 
sensitive, the 3PL provider's service will be more efficient 
compared to the transportation by the distributor himself. 
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Table 5.4: The comparison with respect to the price elasticity 
TDI Scheme 3PL Model — 
b K < < < TT^ TT: 7T*肌 W 
2.00 2.17 1.09 0.54 2.76 0.69 0.17 0.34 36.98% 
2.25 1.10 0 . 5 3 0 . 2 9 1 . 4 5 0.33 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 8 3 6 . 7 5 % 
2.50 0.55 0.26 0.15 0.76 0.16 0.06 o l o " 36.31% 
2.75 0.29 0.13 0.08 0.41 0.09 0.03 0.05 35.44%' 
3.00 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.23 0.04 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 34.23% 
3.25 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.01 o " ^ 32.77% 
3.50 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 31.10% 
3.75 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 29.24% 
So the distributor should choose to use 3PL provider for 
the delivery of the product of which the demand is more 
price sensitive. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Discussion 
Supply chains involving long distance transportation of fresh 
products have become increasingly common in global as well 
as domestic markets. The difference of making decisions in a 
traditional and fresh product decentralized supply chain is that 
the producer and distributor have to take the quantity decline 
during the long distance transportation into consideration. The 
demand model in my study is dependent on the freshness of the 
product when it reaches the market and the deterioration func-
tion 0{t) and the decay function m{t) take general forms. 
6.1 TDI Concluding Remarks 
A generalized conclusion of the TDI scheme is that the coordina-
tion strategy can be reached when the product is highly perish-
able and the demand is very sensitive to the distributor's selling 
price. The producer can make the original decentralized supply 
chain coordinated by offering the TDI scheme under which the 
producer and distributor can enhance their own expected profit 
respectively. At the same time, the whole decentralized supply 
chain profit is increased to the centralized supply chain profit. 
54 
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 55 
In detail, the TDI scheme I defines the transportation cost into 
two parts which divided by q. Our research result implies that 
under the optimal transportation discount factor a* and q = ql, 
the supply chain get coordinated. In addition, under the above 
scheme, the producer will not have motivation to let the distrib-
utor order more than g*, which will decrease its own profit. 
The TDI scheme II makes the whole supply chain coordinated 
through the product quantity loss, freshness compensation and 
buy back contracts. The quantity loss and freshness depend on 
the arrival time t, order quantity q and the buy back contract 
depends on the selling price. The arrival time may be known by 
the producer but the selling price may not be obtained since the 
price decision is made by the distributor. That leads to the TDI 
scheme III, which the coordination only depends on the arrival 
time period t and q. The producer will prefer the scheme III 
since the unknown selling price in scheme II may bring price 
risk. This definitely may let the producer suffer from the loss 
of a certain amount of profit. Meanwhile, we still figure it out 
that the producer's and the distributor's shares of the profit will 
be aiTTc and (1 — a^TTc for scheme II and qstTc and (1 — 0；2)兀0 
for scheme III. To ensure that each party's profit with scheme 
II and III is not less than the traditional decentralized supply 
chain, we can find the upper bound and lower bound of ai and 
{a i and 0^ 2} ^ K i A r � 1 — tt^/ttJ (6.1) 
6.2 3PL Concluding Remarks 
For the supply chain business model involving 3PL provider, it 
is different from the model in paper [4]. Our model considers 
a supply chain with three parties, the producer, the distributor 
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and the 3PL provider. The distributor will sign a contract with 
the 3PL provider to help with the shipping issue. Therefore, the 
transportation cost and the corresponding perishability risks are 
born by the distributor. Meanwhile, we also let the 3PL provider 
set a guaranteed arrival time for the product. If the product ar-
rives late, the 3PL should have to pay the penalty cost to the 
distributor. This let the 3PL provider share portion of the trans-
portation risk for the distributor. The optimal decisions faced 
by the producer, the distributor and the 3PL provider in the 
decentralized supply chain are studied respectively in my thesis. 
Based on the optimal decisions in the fully centralized supply 
chain as a benchmark, we develop an coordination mechanism so 
that the decentralized supply chain acts in an coordinated way. 
Specifically, the coordination mechanism consists of two parts: 
(i) The wholesale pricing policy between the producer and the 
distributor. This policy states a time dependent wholesale price 
discount for every unit sold by the producer, (ii) The penalty 
factor policy between the distributor and the 3PL provider. This 
policy shows the time dependent penalty factor offered by the 
3PL provider to the distributor. Different from the wholesale 
pricing policy, the penalty factor will be increasing to the ar-
rival time t. The 3PL provider is willing to pay more penalty 
cost to the distributor to achieve the cooperation. 
6.3 Future Work 
The investigation of fresh product supply chain with Third-
Party Logistics provider is a relatively new line of research. 
I have considered the situation where the 3rd party logistics 
providers provide a guaranteed arrival time to the distributor. 
In reality, there may be other alternatives among the three par-
ties in the supply chain. For example, the 3rd party logistics 
provider may offer volume discount to the distributor to moti-
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vate the distributor's order behavior. The volume discount can 
be continuous or discrete. This is an interesting problem for 
further research. Another possible extension of this paper is to 
let the producer bear the transportation risk. This is related to 
the common model in export business "GIF" (Cost Insurance 
and Freight). Apparently the uncoordinated and coordinated 
decisions and schemes in GIF transactions will be different. I 
expect that the framework of the model and the related results 
I have established in the current thesis can serve as a basis for 
my further studies. 
口 End of chapter. 
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